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THE ROLE OF MATHEMATICAL CONTEXT IN EVALUATING 
CONDITIONAL STATEMENTS 
 
 
 
Recently there has been increasing interest in the mathematics education research 
community about the role of logic in the teaching, learning and production of 
mathematics. In this paper we investigate how conditional statements are evaluated 
by successful mathematics students, and argue that the role of context is vital to 
determine the manner in which this evaluation proceeds. We use two versions of the 
so-called Labyrinth Task, one in it’s original context and one in an overtly 
mathematical context. We report results that indicates that the manner in which 
conditional statements are evaluated on these tasks differs depending on the context. 
These results are supplemented by data from a qualitative task-based interview study.  
Logical implication is seen as being one of the most important structures in 
mathematics, and researchers have argued that coming to terms with it is vital for 
developing an understanding of proof (Durand-Guerrier, 2003; Weber & Alcock, 
2005). Our goal in this paper is to describe a psychological framework that explains 
the processes involved in evaluating conditional statements in everyday language, 
and to explain how these processes differ in mathematical contexts. To do this we 
first describe a task used by several researchers and teachers to investigate the role of 
logic in mathematical reasoning.  
THE LABYRINTH TASK 
Durand-Guerrier (2003) introduced the so-called Labyrinth Task into the 
mathematics education literature. In this task participants are presented with a maze, 
and told that a person X managed to pass through it without using the same door 
twice.  
They are then asked to categorise a series of statements as 
being either true, false, or that there is not enough 
information to tell (can’t tell): 
1. X crossed P. 
2. X crossed N. 
3. X crossed M. 
4. If X crossed O, then X crossed F. 
5. If X crossed K, then X crossed L. 
6. If X crossed L, then X crossed K. 
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The answers to the first 5 statements appear to be relatively straightforward, but for 
statement 6 the answer becomes less clear. Durand-Guerrier (2003) argued that the 
correct answer is “can’t tell” because it is impossible to know whether X passed 
through K or I before s/he passed through L. When administered to 15-16 year olds 
apparently this was the answer given by 60% of students, “especially those deemed 
good at mathematics” (p.9). However, the students’ teachers apparently disagreed: 
Surprisingly, some teachers considered this answer to be wrong! (p.8) 
The teachers believed that the correct answer was “false”, since according to Durand-
Guerrier’s analysis, they had interpreted the statement as “for all X, if X crossed L, 
then X crossed K”. Suggesting that “can’t tell” is the “natural” answer for students, 
Durand-Guerrier worried that the teacher’s interpretation of the statement causes a 
didactical obstacle for students: 
It is necessary to overcome the opinion that every implication met in the classroom is a 
relation between propositions which is either true or false and that carries necessity. 
Indeed, implication between propositions carries no necessity, but is a set of possible 
cases for truth values. (Our emphasis, p.29). 
The idea that implication is a set of possible truth values may be logically correct, but 
there is a multitude of research that suggests that it is not psychologically correct. In 
the next section we briefly discuss some of this work: Evans & Over’s (2004) theory 
of conditionals based on the so-called Ramsey Test. 
THE RAMSEY TEST – CONDITIONALS IN EVERYDAY LANGUAGE 
According to Ramsey (1931), when people judge the truth/falsity of a conditional in 
natural language they are “hypothetically adding P to their stock of knowledge and 
arguing on that basis about Q”, they are in effect “fixing their degrees of belief in Q 
given P” (p.247). This idea – that to judge P(P!Q) a person judges P(Q|P) rather 
than P(Q or not-P) – has become known as the Ramsey Test. (Here P(X) indicates the 
level of belief that a person has in event X. This is clearly related to, but not 
necessarily identical to, the probability of event X.) 
The notion of the Ramsey Test is a non-trivial model of the manner in which people 
judge conditional statements. Such a model is at odds with both formal logic and 
other psychological accounts of conditional statements, specifically Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne’s (2002) influential mental models framework (for a full discussion of the 
difference between these theories see Evans, Over & Handley, 2005). 
To illustrate how the Ramsey Test operates, consider the statement “if you’re in 
Birmingham, then you have a good choice of Indian takeaways”. This statement is 
judged by hypothetically supposing that you are in Birmingham, and then considering 
the availability of Indian food, given this supposition and your existing knowledge 
and beliefs. Note that this process is both psychologically and logically different to 
the truth evaluation of formal material conditionals. A material conditional P!Q is 
true whenever P or not-Q is true. Thus if you are not in Birmingham and the 
statement is evaluated as a material conditional, then it is automatically true. But 
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evaluated as a suppositional conditional using a Ramsey Test it may be true or false 
depending on the individual involved’s beliefs. There is an increasing body of 
evidence that supports the notion that the Ramsey Test is an accurate model for how 
humans judge conditional statements (e.g. Evans & Over, 2004; Hadjichristidis et al., 
2001).  
How then, does the Ramsey Test apply to the Labyrinth Task? The participant 
hypothetically adds “X crossed L” to their stock of beliefs and then evaluates their 
degree of belief in “X crossed K”. Given the layout of the maze it is clear that 
P(X crossed K | X crossed L) = 0.5 
so Evans & Over’s (2004) theory of suppositional conditionals would predict that 
most people might categorise “if “X crossed L, then X crossed K” as “can’t tell”, as 
they neither have strong belief nor disbelief in the statement. 
However, as we have seen Durand-Guerrier (2003) reports that the mathematics 
teachers who administered the task believed that the correct answer was “false”. It 
seems clear that they were evaluating the statement in a somewhat differently to the 
manner which Evans & Over’s (2004) theory predicts. The purpose of this paper is to 
investigate the role that mathematical context plays in the evaluation of conditional 
statements with the Ramsey Test. 
METHOD 
We were interested in discovering exactly how successful mathematicians evaluate 
the Labyrinth Task, and whether mathematical context plays a part in this. To this 
end we administered two versions of the task. The first version was identical to the 
original task reported above, and the second was phrased in an overtly mathematical 
context: 
Your friend X is interested in a sequence of real numbers, (an). X writes down sentences 
about the sequence. For each of the sentences you must decide whether it is true, false, or 
whether there is not enough information to tell. 
Place each of the following statements into the categories: true, false or can’t tell. 
1. ak=4 for some k " N. 
2. a46 " R. 
3. an # ¾. 
4. If an$1 % an $1 (for all n), then an #&. 
5. If an'  converges, then an # 0. 
6. If an # 0, then an'  converges. 
Parts 4,5 and 6 of this task were designed to be isomorphic to the maze task, but set 
in a mathematical context. Thus presumably Durand-Guerrier (2003) would argue 
that the correct answer to part 6 is “can’t tell” as there are some sequences (an) for 
which this statement is true (from a formal logic standpoint), but some sequences for 
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which it is false. For example the sequence an = n-2 both tends to zero and its 
associated series converges. Thus, since both P and Q are true, “if P, then Q” 
formally is also true. However the sequence an = n-1 tends to zero but its associated 
series does not converge, thus “if P, then Q” is false. So (it could be argued) there is 
not enough information to tell whether statement 6 is true or false. 
The participants were 433 first year mathematics undergraduates from the first 
author’s institution. All the students in our sample had been highly successful school 
level mathematicians, and had typically achieved A Level grades of AAB or higher. 
The cohort was randomly split into two equal groups and each group were given 
either the original or the mathematical version of the task. The task was administered 
as part of a biweekly test that formed a minor part of the assessmenti of a first year 
Foundations of Mathematics course (which included sections on logic and 
implication). All the students were simultaneously taking a course in Analysis and so 
should have been familiar with the terms used in the mathematical version of the 
question. 
RESULTS 
In this section we report the results of part 6 of each version of the labyrinth task. 
These figures are shown in Table 1. It can clearly be seen that the range of responses 
was different between the versions. In the original version participants were fairly 
evenly split between the ‘false’ (44%) and ‘can’t tell’ (54%) responses, with almost 
no one selecting ‘true’ (2%). However, in the mathematical version a large minority 
of participants selected ‘true’ (30%), and few selected ‘can’t tell’ (14%).  
 
Table 1: The breakdown of responses, as percentages, to statement 6.                              
T – true, F – false, C – can’t tell. 
The difference between the responses (by test version) reported in Table 1 is highly 
significant, with a large effect size, (2=107, df=2, p<0.001, )=0.498. 
However, we were concerned that some of the differences between the test versions 
could be attributed to poor subject knowledge in the mathematics version. For 
example, it is hard to see how any structural property of conditional statements could 
lead participants to judge part 6 of the mathematical version to be true. To try to 
mitigate this distorting effect we removed all participants from our analysis who 
answered part 5 incorrectly. That is to say that we were only interested in the 
responses (to part 6) of participants who were sufficiently aware of the properties of 
sequences and series to answer part 5 of the mathematical version correctly 
Answer Original Maths Total
T 2 30 16 
  F 44 56 50 
  C 54 14 34 
n 216 214 430 
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(although, for consistency, we also removed the 7 participants who incorrectly 
answered part 5 of the original version). After removing these participants from the 
analysis, the percentage of ‘true’ answers to the mathematical version was reduced 
from 30% to 9%. These data are shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: The breakdown of responses, as percentages, of those participants who 
answered part 5 correctly, to statement 6. 
The figures in Table 2 are clear. The mathematical version of the task elicited many 
more “false” responses than did the original version. This difference is highly 
significant, with a moderate effect size, (2=48.9, df=2, p<0.001, )=0.371.  
DISCUSSION 
The results from this study are interesting for several reasons. Recall that Durand-
Guerrier (2003) reported that approximately 60% of 15-16 year old students 
responded with “can’t tell” to statement 6 of the original labyrinth task, and noted 
that this response tended to be given by students of high mathematical abilities. Our 
results cast doubt upon this interpretation. Our sample of extremely able 18-19 year 
old students were fairly evenly split on this item. If there was some correlation 
between mathematical ability and answering “can’t tell”, we would expect a 
substantially higher percentage of our participants to have answered in this way.  
It is also clear that the context in which the question is set has a significant influence 
upon responses. Conditional sentences in mathematical contexts appear, across the 
sample, to be treated differently to conditional sentences in non-mathematical 
contexts. Paradoxically, the mathematical context appears to bias highly able students 
towards what Durand-Guerrier (2003) believed was the mathematically incorrect 
answer.  
THE RAMSEY TEST – CONDITIONALS IN MATHEMATICS 
How then can we account for these results? It seems that a mathematical context  
fundamentally alters the manner in which conditional statements are evaluated. But 
how? To see how mathematicians evaluated statement 6 in the labyrinth task we 
conducted 11 task-based interviews with a range of university level mathematics 
students. Participants were asked to solve the original task whilst speaking out loud. 
In the following extract we report how one student, Rachel, responded to the original 
version of the task. Rachel is a postgraduate student, and had been a teaching 
Answer Original Maths Total
T 2 9 5 
  F 44 73 56 
  C 54 18 39 
n 209 146 355 
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assistant on the Foundations of Mathematics module in which formal logic is taught 
to first year undergraduates. 
Rachel: This one [statement 6] is wrong. 
Interviewer: Why? 
Rachel: Well the statement is saying that if he crossed L then he definitely crossed 
K, which is not true. Because you could have gone I-L-M and then leave 
the maze and then you wouldn't have gone through K, I mean it would 
have been a possibility to go through both, but it’s not a necessity, which 
makes the statement wrong. 
Here Rachel is clearly not using the Ramsey Test to evaluate statement 6. Instead she 
interprets the conditional statement as demanding that X necessarily has to have gone 
through K if s/he went through L. The interviewer asks what would happen if more 
knowledge about the route became available: 
Interviewer:  OK. How would you react if I told you what the route was? [Describes a 
route that does go through L and K]. How would that affect [statement 6]? 
So if the person did go through K and L? 
Rachel: Well it’s still wrong. Because this is just a conditional thing saying that if 
this happens then something else happens and this, you know, this has got 
to be true for all routes that cross L not just the particular one chosen. You 
know, as I said, you can go through K and L and still leave the maze 
without going through any door twice. So it's a possibility, so it’s not 
wrong in the sense that it can never ever happen, but it’s an implication 
that you can't make. 
So Rachel clearly believed, contrary to Durand-Guerrier’s logical analysis, that 
implication does carry necessity, for her it is not merely a set of truth values. When 
the interviewer points out the truth table for “P!Q” and argues that an analysis along 
these lines suggests that the sentence could be either true or false depending on the 
particular route, Rachel remains unconvinced: 
Rachel: I don't believe your argument, I'm sorry.  
Interviewer: So where’s the flaw in my argument? 
Rachel: Umm, I don't know… umm, I don't know, that's the problem I have at the 
moment […] 
Interviewer: So if you were teaching some first years and [the labyrinth task] was a 
question on their exam, what answer would you hope that they'd give to 
number 6? 
Rachel: That's a tricky question. If they'd just done logic and they'd drawn a truth 
table and said, you know, you've got both in the last column so you can't 
tell which it is, I suspect I would feel obliged to give them full marks. 
Whilst Rachel, a successful mathematician, clearly understands the argument based 
on truth values, she remains unconvinced by it. Nevertheless she grudgingly accepts 
it may be ‘correct’ in some unnatural formal sense.  
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Although the transcript indicates that Rachel has all the information required to 
perform a Ramsey Test successfully and deduce that P(Q|P)=0.5, she resists. Instead 
Rachel seems to be demanding that, for a conditional statement to be true in 
mathematics, P(Q|P) must be equal to 1. That is to say that for the statement “P!Q” 
to be evaluated as “true”, once P has been added hypothetically to her stock of 
knowledge, she is demanding to be able to conclude Q with absolute certainty. Thus 
the Ramsey Test appears to operate differently in mathematical contexts for 
mathematicians than in general day-to-day life. 
This idea of a modified Ramsey Test has strong connections with Weber & Alcock’s 
(2005) notion of a warranted conditional. Drawing on Toulmin’s (1958) work on 
informal logic and argumentation, they define a conditional “P!Q” to be warranted 
if the consequent Q necessarily follows, by some valid mathematical procedure, from 
the antecedent P. They suggest that a conditional statement is invalid in mathematics 
unless it is warranted. Recall our example from the mathematical labyrinth task: 
If an # 0, then an'  converges.       (*) 
In Weber & Alcock’s terms, this statement is unwarranted as the consequent does not 
necessarily follow from the antecedent. However the statement is true for certain 
sequences (an). In the language of Ramsey (1931) and Evans & Over (2004). Weber 
& Alcock are saying that when evaluating this statement a person hypothetically adds 
the belief that (an) tends to zero to their stock of knowledge, and evaluates their 
degree of belief in the series converging. If their degree of belief is not 100%, or 
thereabouts, the conditional is rejected as unwarranted and false. 
Evaluating the Ramsey Test in mathematical contexts may be a non-trivial matter, 
and in some circumstances it may rely more upon general knowledge of the subject 
matter than it does on the actual argument contained in the proof. Indeed it has even 
been argued that acceptable mathematical proofs routinely contain ‘gaps’ that break 
the chain of implications justified by ‘valid’ mathematical warrants (Fallis, 2003).  
WHICH RAMSEY TEST? THE ROLE OF CONTEXT 
Our results clearly indicate that the majority of first year undergraduates evaluated 
statement (*) as being false, suggesting that they conducted a modified version of the 
Ramsey Test. However, for the original version of the task roughly half the sample 
answered “false” and half answered “can’t tell”. So if our analysis is correct than 
there was no clear agreement whether to use the modified version of the Ramsey Test 
or the standard version. We argue that this is because the context was less clearly 
mathematical in this version. The labyrinth task is not overtly a mathematical 
question, despite appearing in a mathematics test. However, the mathematical 
labyrinth task is visibly mathematical: it refers to subject matter from real analysis. 
We believeii that mathematicians judge everyday conditionals – such as “if you’re in 
Birmingham, then you have a good choice of Indian takeaways” – in the same 
manner as the rest of the population. Namely, according to Evans and Overs’s (2004) 
theory, they conduct a standard Ramsey Test to fix their degree of belief in Q given 
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P. But when in the mathematics classroom, the lecture theatre or the office, they 
seem to behave differently: they use a modified version of the Ramsey Test, which 
demands that P(Q|P) is equal to 1. 
We, therefore, believe that Durand-Guerrier (2003) should not have been surprised 
that the teachers she spoke to considered “can’t tell” to be the incorrect answer to part 
6 of the labyrinth task. The teachers were evaluating what they believed to be a 
mathematical statement in a manner appropriate for a mathematical context.  
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i The assessment was set up in such a way so that the students’ overall mark would be improved if 
they performed well on the experimental question, but that if they scored below their average mark 
for the rest of the test, the experimental section would be ignored. Thus all the participants had an 
incentive to take the experimental questions seriously, but would not be disadvantaged by a poor 
performance on this section. 
ii Note, however, that we have no empirical evidence to back this belief up. More work is needed on 
individual differences in contextual reasoning behaviour. 
 
